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In this article we investigate the circumstances under which it makes sense for members at 
various stages of the product development value chain to develop shared understanding, or, 
alternatively, to operate as “mutually ignorant” specialists. After reviewing extant literature 
pertaining to this question, we propose a set of hypotheses, and develop a program of 
computational experimentation to test them. Our findings both replicate extant theoretical views 
concerning the substitutability of specialist and trans-specialist knowledge types, and also 
suggest that the two knowledge types can exist as complements. Compared to previous analytic 
models designed to shed light on this question, our findings offer a much finer-grained analysis 
along multiple dimensions of performance, including cost, schedule, product quality and 
component quality. For instance, our findings indicate that trans-specialist knowledge becomes 
increasingly beneficial as competitive strategy becomes more sensitive to product quality, as 
product designs become less modular, and as decision-making becomes less centralized. With 
this study we offer three main contributions. First, we critique extant theory relating to the 
substitutability of specialist and interspecialist knowledge. Second, we offer new conceptual 
thinking and hypothesis testing concerning the relative costs and benefits of employing the two 
knowledge types under different organization circumstances. Third, we apply an agent based 
computational simulation approach in our analysis, and discuss the power of this method in 
testing theory related to organizational knowing and learning.  
                                                          
1 We wish to thank our colleagues Bill Gates, Carl Jones, Ashwin Mahalingam, Tamaki Horii, John 
Chachere and Marc Ramsey for their helpful suggestions on this paper. The research described in this 
article is funded in part by the Office of Naval Research, Young Investigator Program 
(N0001401WR20304), and by the Command & Control Research Program, Center for Edge Power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge is central to effective management and performance in the modern organization. In 
a resource-based view of the firm, knowledge is considered by many scholars (e.g., Cole 1998, 
Grant 1996, Spender 1996) to represent the most important resource a firm can hold. Indeed, 
knowledge offers a source of sustainable comparative advantage (Drucker 1995). Toward this 
end, the field of organization studies has undertaken substantial research on organizational 
knowing (e.g., Cook and Brown 1999) and learning (e.g., Levitt and March 1988).  
However, the bulk of this research focuses on theory building (e.g., Brown and Duguid 
1991, Kogut and Zander 1992, March 1991, Nonaka 1994, Thomas et al. 2001, Van den Bosch 
et al. 1999, Zollo and Winter 2002), and includes a dearth of theory testing (cf. Birkenshaw et al. 
2002), the latter of which is important also for cumulative theoretical development (Bacharach 
1989). The main explanation for this paucity of theory testing in organizations research centers 
on methodological problems—affecting both labwork (e.g., external validity, generalizability) and 
fieldwork (e.g., access, cost, internal validity, reliability). 
Recent advances in computational organization theory (e.g., see Burton et al. 2002, 
Carley and Lin 1997, Levitt et al. 1999, Lomi & Larsen 2001) offer promising potential to 
facilitate testing organizational knowing and learning theories. For instance, to represent and 
reason about organizational processes, one can conduct computational experiments with levels 
of rigor and control comparable to laboratory experimentation. This can support greater internal 
validity and reliability than is obtainable often through fieldwork. Computational experiments can 
be conducted also to examine myriad different organizational designs, including cases that have 
yet to be implemented in physical organizations (Nissen 2005). Moreover, organizational 
environments of substance are not manipulated easily in the field, and laboratory experiments 
are limited generally to micro-level organizational phenomena.  
In this article we apply computational experimentation to examine, test and extend a 
recent and controversial, theoretical article (Postrel 2002) pertaining to organizational knowing 
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and learning. Our research is motivated by an important question posed by Postrel: When is it 
necessary for adjacent stages of the value chain to invest in the development of shared 
understanding, and alternatively, when does it make sense for them to operate in mutual 
ignorance? This question is important, because it addresses an inherent challenge in the design 
of the product development value chain: If members in various stages are too specialized, they 
cannot coordinate effectively because they have different "thought worlds" or "interpretive 
schemes" (Dougherty 1992; Schein 1996); yet, if members lack sufficient specialization, they 
perform slowly, commit costly mistakes and fail generally to make meaningful contributions to 
the efficient attainment of strategic objectives. Indeed, just as specialists are needed to perform 
tasks efficiently, trans-specialists are required to ensure integrated performance in cross-
functional work (Rulke & Galaskiewicz 2000).  Thus, the inherent difficulty lies in aligning the 
value chain with appropriate quantities and distributions of specialists and trans-specialists to 
promote coordinated action that is both effective and efficient. 
Our examination and testing focus on controversial results from Postrel’s analytical 
model: that specialist and trans-specialist knowledge are substitutes in the domain of product 
development. A key implication of such substitutability is that trans-specialist knowledge (e.g., 
designers’ understanding of manufacturing, manufacturers’ understanding of design) is rarely 
important, given sufficient specialist capability on “either side”. However, the resultant metaphor 
islands of shared knowledge counters much current thinking in terms of knowledge transfer, 
inter-functional coordination, concurrent development and even matrix management for the 
organization of specialized work.  
Using a computational model that has benefited from extensive empirical validation, we 
replicate some basic results from this analytical model. Then, through a program of 
computational experimentation, we expand on these results, analyze realistic cases in which 
they fail to hold, and examine together important factors (e.g., knowledge, competitive strategy, 
centralization), which are largely unaddressed in combination by the literature. 
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Overall, our computational modeling approach enables a finer-grained set of theoretical 
insights than could be achieved with the analytical model. Thus, our findings shed new light on 
Postrel’s important question concerning the circumstances that necessitate trans-specialist 
knowledge in the value chain. In addition, our findings showcase the power and potential of 
computational modeling and simulation for conducting organizational research. 
The following section presents theoretical background and hypotheses, after which we 
describe our computational model, present the results, and draw conclusions. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND & HYPOTHESES 
We begin by summarizing key aspects of Postrel’s (2002) analytic model, as a basis to craft a 
null hypothesis. We then summarize relevant theory, and formulate hypotheses that 
complement, extend and compete with such analytic model. 
Islands of Shared Knowledge 
In order to investigate the relative contributions of specialist and trans-specialist knowledge to 
the performance of an organization engaged in product development, Postrel (2002) derived a 
two-parameter production function: M = zh/[zh + (1-z)(1-h)]. The expected payoff is represented 
by M, which corresponds to a distribution of design outcomes. Trans-specialist capability is 
represented by a single parameter h, which specifies the design actor’s probability of sending a 
producible design to its downstream counterpart in manufacturing; as h increases so does the 
likelihood that a specific design can be produced. Likewise, specialist capability is represented 
by a single parameter z, which specifies a manufacturing actor’s probability of making a 
successful product; as z rises so does the likelihood that a range of designs can be 
manufactured successfully.  
Notice that the production function returns the value 1, the maximum expected payoff, 
when either parameter z or h is 1; that is, when either knowledge type (i.e., specialist or trans-
specialist) is high, maximum payoff is assured for any value of the second knowledge type 
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greater than zero. Notice this production function also returns the value 1 when both parameters 
z and h are 1; that is, nothing is gained when both knowledge types are at high levels. Notice 
further the production function returns the value 0 (i.e., no payoff) if zero values are allowed for 
either parameter z or h; that is, no level of one knowledge type is sufficient to compensate for a 
complete absence of the other. According to the production function, these payoff relations are 
guaranteed. 
 Based on the results of the analytical model, Postrel concludes (pg. 310) that “Specialist 
capability and trans-specialist understanding are primarily substitutes in the design production 
function.” This constitutes the null hypothesis of our present study, 
H0: Specialist and trans-specialist knowledge can be substituted for one 
another without affecting performance. 
Hypothesis Development 
As with any nontrivial representation, the analytical model described above necessarily involves 
numerous assumptions. Some of these assumptions are realistic and helpful to make the 
mathematics tractable, and their inclusion seems relatively innocuous. Yet several others, which 
drive the principal results obtained, are questionable in terms of microeconomic and 
organization theory. Here we discuss seven assumptions, to which we take greatest exception, 
and articulate hypotheses that complement, extend and compete with results of the analytical 
model.  
1. Assumption of unidimensional performance 
The analytic model suggests that performance in the design production process can be 
measured along a single dimension, labeled the “expected payoff” (Postrel, 2002). However, 
studies of product development suggest instead that performance is a multi-faceted, omnibus 
concept with many trade-offs between sub-dimensions such as cost, time, component quality 
and product integration quality (eg. Smith and Reinertsen 1991, Bayus 1997). 
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 This assumption of unidimensional performance is problematic, because it obscures 
finer-grained relationships between the two knowledge types and the individual sub-dimensions 
of performance.  For example, studies of product development indicate that trans-specialist 
knowledge—often labeled under other rubrics such as “system-wide understanding”, “cross-
functional expertise” or “interspecialty capability”—is necessary in order to avoid the kinds of 
catastrophic interfunctional glitches that lead to product integration failure (Allen and Cohen 
1967, Allen 1977, Cooper 1979, Carrol 1998, Hoopes and Postrel 1999). However, 
organizations like NASA provide evidence that increasing trans-specialist knowledge with the 
intention of producing a design with greater manufacturability can have the consequence of 
increasing design cycle time as more constraints are placed on requirements (Vaughan 1990). 
Finally, with respect to specialist knowledge, studies of human learning reveal that task-
repetition and functional-specialization reduce the likelihood of task-specific errors (Staddon 
1983). Based on these insights from theory, we draw our first set of hypotheses: 
H1a: Trans-specialist knowledge has benefits in reducing product integration risk, but 
does not contribute to a reduction in individual component risk;  
 
H1b: Increasing trans-specialist knowledge may actually increase—and not 
decrease—the schedule duration of the design activity. 
 
H1c: Specialist knowledge has benefits in reducing component risk, but does not 
contribute to a reduction in overall product integration risk.  
 
2. Assumption of hyper-substitutability of knowledge types 
The production function derived in the analytical model from above is not what one would 
expect ex-ante in terms of neoclassical microeconomics (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998, 
Samuelson 1974). In particular, the production function derived in the analytical model produces 
many isoquants that are concave to the origin (Postrel 2002: 311). The implication is, the more 
of one type of knowledge used in a process, the greater its marginal productivity becomes, 
hence rendering the other type relatively less valuable. In the case of product development and 
the analytical model, as an organization gains substantial specialist knowledge, for instance, 
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gaining additional trans-specialist knowledge becomes decreasingly valuable, and vice versa. 
This denotes a condition of hypersubstitution: not only do two (or more) input factors of 
production—specialist and trans-specialist knowledge in this case—represent economic 
substitutes for one another, but normative decision rules and cost assumptions drive the level of 
one (or more) input factor toward zero. This is a central result of the analytical model. 
 In contrast, a more traditional class of production functions (e.g., the Cobb-Douglas 
function) reflect isoquants that are convex to the origin. Here levels of one or more input factors 
are traded off against other factors, depending upon their relative marginal rates of technical 
substitution (MRTS) and marginal costs (MC). Only in extreme cases would one input factor be 
driven merely by decision-making rules toward zero level in such arrangements. This represents 
a condition of substitution: input factors such as specialist knowledge and trans-specialist 
knowledge represent economic substitutes. Normative decision rules would suggest some 
combination of the two knowledge types, with specific levels determined by MRTS and MC. 
Moreover, many, diverse input factors can also represent economic complements: using 
more (or less) of one input factor benefits from using more (or less) of the other(s) also. To the 
extent that specialist knowledge and trans-specialist knowledge complement one another, then 
one can argue, economically, that more of both should be used in production; that is, levels of 
the input factors should covary according to normative decision rules. This can be the case 
even for classical productions functions such as the Cobb-Douglass (e.g., with nonnegative 
exponents suggesting supermodularity; see Milgrom and Roberts 1995, p. 183). Indeed, many, 
common, modern manufacturing approaches (e.g., lean manufacturing, flexible production, 
mass customization, design for manufacturing) seek to leverage just such complementary 
relations between input factors (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Hence arguing microeconomically, 
we see little reason to assume the kind of hypersubstitution implied by the analytical model. This 
leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
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H2a: Specialist and trans-specialist knowledge used in product 
development may represent economic complements. 
 
H2b: Using predominately specialist knowledge in product development leads to 
inferior performance than when appreciable levels of trans-specialist knowledge 
are employed also. 
3. Assumption of “one-size-fits-all” competitive strategy 
The analytic model ignores the fact that different firms have different competitive 
strategies for how they position their products in the marketplace. Yet the strategy 
literature indicates that firms guided by a cost-leadership strategy maximize their payoff 
by producing low-cost products; whereas firms with a product-differentiation strategy 
excel by offering products of superior quality, novelty, technological sophistication, and 
like differentiating attributes (Porter 1980: 35-37). Porter explains that the effective 
execution of these generic strategies requires very different skills, resources and 
organizational capabilities. Competing on product cost alone is usually achieved through 
tight cost-control and the efficiencies of high-volume production by specialized factory 
workers (eg. modular home production). Quite the opposite, product differentiation is 
attained generally through a creative design process with strong cooperation across 
specialties (eg. custom-home production). Thus, a firm’s competitive strategy affects the 
marginal value of the different knowledge types. This leads to our third set of 
hypotheses: 
H3a: The greater the importance of low-cost production, the greater the 
importance of specialist relative to trans-specialist knowledge. 
 
H3b: The greater the importance of product quality, the greater the importance 
of trans-specialist versus specialist knowledge. 
4. Assumption of equal modularity across products 
The analytical model assumes that all product designs exist with an equivalent level of 
modularity between components. But research shows that product modularity is highly variable 
across products and in different phases of product evolution (Schilling 2000, Baldwin & Clark 
2000). Newer products tend to have larger numbers of more quickly evolving, component parts 
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with intricate and changing interfaces, while more mature products tend to have fewer, more 
standardized interdependencies (Utterback 1996). As product modularity changes, so does 
organizational modularity (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004) and the 
marginal value of trans-specialists in the organization. When modularity is low, interspecialists 
are needed urgently to resolve negatively interacting sub-goals between components through 
the mechanisms of coordination and mutual adjustment (Thompson 1967; March and Simon 
1968). But as modularity rises, interspecialists become less important. More formally, 
H4: As product modularity rises, the marginal benefit of trans-specialist knowledge 
falls. 
5. Assumption of equal complexity across components 
The analytic model makes no distinction between the levels of complexity of different 
component parts in the value chain. Yet complexity is a key factor thought to influence cognitive 
task performance (Locke and Latham 1990, Simon 1981), and it is commonly believed that as 
complexity rises, it is necessary to employ increasingly talented specialists to produce 
components of a given level of quality (Campbell 1988). Thus, we draw a fifth hypothesis, 
H5: As product component complexity rises, the marginal benefit of specialist 
knowledge also rises. 
6. Assumption of sequential interdependence across work processes 
Product development in the analytical model involves only sequential interdependence between 
the design and manufacturing actors. Although some product development processes in 
practice do fit this sequential characterization, very few complex products are developed in this 
“over the wall” fashion. Most are conducted with some level of concurrency between the stages 
of the value chain (e.g., design-build, prototyping).  
From a performance standpoint, while concurrency brings a reduction in overall project 
duration, it also creates reciprocal interdependence between the design and manufacturing 
activities (Thompson 1967), which requires additional cost and effort to coordinate (March and 
Simon 1958). This introduces a time-cost tradeoff (Mustafa and Murphree 1989, Russel and 
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Ranasinghe 1991), for the cost of rework and increased product failure risk can exceed any 
savings gained through concurrent development (Stacey 1991, Kunz et al 1999, Salazar-Kish 
2001). With increasing levels of concurrency, spikes in coordination and rework intensify, and 
thus trans-specialist knowledge becomes increasingly important and beneficial in avoiding and 
resolving cross-functional glitches (Hoopes and Postrel 1999). All of these effects are ignored in 
the simple analytical model, and they lead to our sixth set of hypotheses. 
H6a: As the level of concurrency between design and manufacturing 
activities increases, schedule duration decreases, but costs rise, and 
product quality risks increase. 
 
H6b: As the level of concurrency between design and manufacturing 
activities increases, the importance of trans-specialist knowledge 
increases with respect to that of specialist knowledge. 
7. Assumption of equal centralization across organizations 
The analytic model is silent with respect to the impact of different organizational policies 
of centralization or decentralization on the need for trans-specialist knowledge. However, 
organizational theory suggests that as centralization increases, and as managers take 
more responsibility for discretionary decisions, then it becomes less important for lower 
level subordinates to understand all of the integration requirements of their work with 
other interdependent teams (Burton & Obel 2004). Alternatively, as centralization 
decreases, subordinates make more of their own decisions without consulting a 
supervisor, and thus it becomes more important that they have a system-wide 
understanding of the overall product architecture in order to avoid product-integration 
errors. Therefore, we draw a seventh and final hypothesis: 
H7: As decision making becomes more highly centralized to management, 
it becomes less important for subordinates to possess trans-specialist 
knowledge to achieve a given level of product quality. 
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COMPUTATIONAL MODELING BACKGROUND 
In this section we discuss briefly computational organization theory, and draw related material 
from Nissen and Levitt (2004) to provide an overview of our computational modeling approach. 
We then describe the computational model developed to test our hypotheses. 
Computational Organization Theory Research 
Computational organization theory (COT) is an emerging, multidisciplinary field that integrates 
aspects of artificial intelligence, organization studies and system dynamics/simulation (e.g., see 
Carley and Prietula 1994). Nearly all research in this developing field involves computational 
tools, which are employed to support computational experimentation and theorem proving 
through executable models developed to emulate the behaviors of physical organizations (e.g., 
see Burton et al. 2002, Carley and Lin 1997, Levitt et al. 1999).  
As the field has matured, several distinct classes of models have evolved for particular 
purposes, including: descriptive models, quasi-realistic models, normative models, and man-
machine interaction models for training (Cohen and Cyert 1965, Burton and Obel 1995). More 
recent models have been used for purposes such as developing theory, testing theory and 
competing hypotheses, fine-tuning laboratory experiments and field studies, reconstructing 
historical events, extrapolating and analyzing past trends, exploring basic principles, and 
reasoning about organizational and social phenomenon (Carley and Hill 2001: 87).  
Our research through the Virtual Design Team (VDT) is a branch of COT, built upon the 
planned accumulation of collaborative research over almost two decades to develop rich theory-
based models of organizational processes (Levitt 2004). Using an agent-based representation 
(Cohen 1992, Kunz et al. 1999), micro-level organizational behaviors have been researched 
and formalized to reflect well-accepted organization theory (Levitt et al. 1999). Extensive 
empirical validation projects (e.g., Christiansen 1993, Thomsen 1998) have demonstrated the 
representational fidelity, and shown how the qualitative and quantitative behaviors of VDT 
computational models correspond closely with a diversity of enterprise processes in practice. 
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The VDT research program continues today with the goal of developing new micro-
organization theory, and embedding it in software tools that can be used to design organizations 
in the same way that engineers design bridges, semiconductors or airplanes—through 
computational modeling, analysis and evaluation of multiple virtual prototypes. Clearly this 
represents a significant challenge. Micro-theory and analysis tools for designing bridges and 
airplanes rest on well-understood principles of physics (e.g., involving continuous numerical 
variables, describing materials whose properties are relatively easy to measure), and analysis of 
such physical systems yields easily differential equations and precise numerical computing. Of 
course, people, organizations and business processes differ from bridges, airplanes and 
semiconductors, and it is irrational to expect the former to ever be as understandable, 
analyzable or predictable as the latter. This represents a fundamental limitation of the approach. 
Within the constraints of this limitation, however, we can still take great strides beyond 
relying upon informal and ambiguous, verbal, theoretical descriptions of organizational behavior. 
For instance, the domain of organization theory is imbued with a rich, time-tested collection of 
micro-theories that lend themselves to qualitative representation and analysis. Examples 
include Galbraith's (1977) information processing abstraction, March and Simon’s (1958) 
bounded rationality assumption, and Thompson’s (1967) task interdependence contingencies. 
Drawing on this theory, we employ symbolic (i.e., non-numeric) representation and reasoning 
techniques from established research on artificial intelligence to develop computational models 
of theoretical phenomena. Once formalized through a computational model, the symbolic 
representation is “executable,” meaning it can be used to emulate organizational dynamics. 
Even though the representation has qualitative elements (e.g., lacking the precision 
offered by numerical models), through commitment to computational modeling, it becomes 
semi-formal (e.g., most people viewing the model can agree on what it describes), reliable (e.g., 
the same sets of organizational conditions and environmental factors generate the same sets of 
behaviors) and explicit (e.g., much ambiguity inherent in natural language is obviated). 
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Particularly when used in conjunction with the descriptive natural language theory of our extant 
literature, this represents a substantial advance.  
Additionally, although organizations are inherently less understandable, analyzable and 
predictable than physical systems are, and the behavior of people is non-deterministic and 
difficult to model at the individual level, it is known well that individual differences tend to 
average out when aggregated cross-sectionally or longitudinally. Thus, when modeling 
aggregations of people, such as work groups, departments, or firms, one can augment the kind 
of symbolic model from above with certain aspects of numerical representation. For instance, 
the distribution of skill levels in an organization can be approximated—in aggregate—by a Bell 
Curve; the probability of a given task incurring exceptions and requiring rework can be 
specified—organization wide—by a distribution; and the irregular attention of a worker to any 
particular activity or event (e.g., new work task or communication) can be modeled—
stochastically—to approximate collective behavior. As another instance, specific organizational 
behaviors can be simulated hundreds of times—such as through Monte Carlo techniques—to 
gain insight into which results are common and expected versus rare and exceptional. 
Of course, applying numerical simulation techniques to organizations is hardly new (Law 
and Kelton 1991). But this approach enables us to integrate the kinds of dynamic, qualitative 
behaviors emulated by symbolic models with quantitative metrics generated through discrete-
event simulation. It is through such integration of qualitative and quantitative models—bolstered 
by reliance on sound theory and devotion to empirical validation—that our approach diverges 
most from extant research methods, and offers new insight into the organizational dynamics. 
VDT Computational Modeling Environment 
The VDT computational modeling environment consists of the elements described in Table 1, 
and has been developed directly from Galbraith’s information processing view of organizations. 
This view of organizations, described in detail in Jin and Levitt (1996), has two key implications.  
 13
Center for Edge Power – Working Paper 2006-1 
VDT Model
Element Element Description
Tasks Abstract representations of any work that consumes time, is required for project completion and can generate exceptions.
Actors A person or a group of persons who perform work and process information. 
Exceptions Simulated situations where an actor needs additional information, requires a decision from a supervisor, or discovers an error that needs correcting.
Milestones Points in a project where major business objectives are accomplished, but such markers neither represent tasks nor entail effort.
Successor 
links
Define an order in which tasks and milestones occur in a model, but they do not constrain 
these events to occur in a strict sequence. Tasks can also occur in parallel. VDT offers three 
types of successor links: finish-start, start-start and finish-finish.
Rework 
links
Similar to successor links because they connect one task (called the driver  task) with 
another (called the dependent  task). However, rework links also indicate that the dependent 
task depends on the success of the driver task, and that the project's success is also in some 
way dependent on this. If the driver fails, some rework time is added to all dependent tasks 
linked to the driver task by rework links. The volume of rework is then associated with the 
project error probability settings.
Task 
assignments




Show which actors supervise which subordinates. In VDT, the supervision structure (also 
called the exception-handling hierarchy ) represents a hierarchy of positions, defining who a 
subordinate would go to for information or to report an exception.
 
Table 1  VDT Model Elements and Element Descriptions 
 
The first is ontological: we model knowledge work through interactions of tasks to be performed; 
actors communicating with one another, and performing tasks; and an organization structure 
that defines actors’ roles, and constrains their behaviors. Figure 1 illustrates this view of tasks, 
actors and organization structure. As suggested by the figure, we model the organization 
structure as a network of reporting relations, which can capture micro-behaviors such as 
managerial attention, span of control, and empowerment. We represent the task structure as a 
separate network of activities, which can capture organizational attributes such as expected 
duration, complexity and required skills. Within the organization structure, we further model 
various roles (e.g., marketing analyst, design engineer, manager), which can capture 
organizational attributes such as skills possessed, levels of experience, and task familiarity. 
Within the task structure, we further model various sequencing constraints, interdependencies, 
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and quality/rework loops, which can capture considerable variety in terms of how knowledge 
work is organized and performed.  
As also suggested by the figure, each actor within the intertwined organization and task 
structures has a queue of information tasks to be performed (e.g., assigned work activities, 
messages from other actors, meetings to attend) and a queue of information outputs (e.g., 
completed work products, communications to other actors, requests for assistance). Each actor 
processes such tasks according to how well the actor’s skill set matches those required for a 
given activity, the relative priority of the task, the actor’s work backlog (i.e., queue length), and 
how many interruptions divert the actor’s attention from the task at hand. 
The second implication is computational: work volume is modeled in terms of both direct 
work (e.g., planning, design, manufacturing) and indirect work (e.g., decision wait time, rework, 
coordination work). Measuring indirect work enables the quantitative assessment of (virtual) 
process performance (e.g., through schedule growth, cost growth, quality). 
Communications






Figure 1   Information Processing View of Knowledge Work 
VDT Computational Model Validation 
The VDT computational model has been validated extensively, over a period spanning almost 
two decades, by a team of more than 30 researchers in the VDT research group at Stanford 
University (Levitt 2004). This validation process has involved three primary streams of effort: 1) 
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internal validation against micro-social science research findings and against observed micro-
behaviors in real-world organizations, 2) external validation against the predictions of macro-
theory and against the observed macro-experience of real-world organizations, and 3) model 
cross-docking experiments against the predictions of other computational models with the same 
input data sets (Levitt et al. 2005). VDT is one of the few extant computational organization 
models that has been subjected to such a thorough, multi-method trajectory of validation. 
COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATION & HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
In this section we formulate a computational model of the product development process to 
replicate and critique Postrel’s (2002) analytic model, and to simulate additional scenarios to 
test our hypotheses. We then discuss our contributions to theory. But first, we describe the 
model set-up, and define the independent and dependent variables used in the analysis.  
Model Set-Up 
We use the VDT modeling environment to formulate a model reflecting the basic structure and 
behavior of the analytical model described in Postrel (2002). Beginning with structural aspects 
of the model, Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the POW-ER2 user interface. As with Postrel’s 
analytic model, this computational model includes only two tasks (i.e., manufacturing and 
design), each performed by a corresponding organizational unit (i.e., manufacturing actor and 
design actor), with bi-directional rework links to model Postrel’s requirement (pg. 308) that the 
model have “an interaction between the two specialists where the choices of one effect the 
performance of the other.” Including only two tasks is clearly a high-level modeling abstraction; 
VDT models of physical organizations in practice typically involve much more detail.  However, 
we specify this minimalist model in conformance with the analytic model, and following Postrel’s 
advice (pg. 308) that, “the idea is to take the simplest possible situation in which specialized 
                                                          
2 POW-ER ™ is a flexible and extensible computational organizational modeling and simulation environment that replicates and 
extends key features of VDT.  It was developed by Stanford University with funding from the Center for Edge Power at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, USA. 
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capability and trans-specialist understanding both matter.” Also for consistency with the 
analytical model, the organization structure reflects no management hierarchy or supervision 
links. 
 
Figure 2   VDT Product Development Model 
 
All VDT model parameters (e.g., team experience, centralization, formalization) are set 
to empirically determined nominal values for product development. Values for such parameters 
are held constant for all simulations discussed in this article, except as noted otherwise. 
The product development process is specified with a nominal work volume of 200 
person-days, which is held constant for all models and simulations discussed in this article. In 
VDT, simulated total work volume is determined stochastically (e.g., using Monte Carlo 
techniques) as a function of nominal work volume (an input) and several empirically determined 
factors that affect indirect work and productivity (e.g., actor skill, requirement complexity). 
Independent VDT Variables 
Table 2 describes the VDT parameters used to represent the set of independent variables 
included in our VDT model of the product development cycle. To represent behavioral aspects 
of the analytical model, we disaggregate specialist and trans-specialist knowledge with an 
approach that is both theoretically consistent and empirically grounded. We manipulate the 
single VDT parameter manufacturing skill to represent different levels of manufacturing 
specialist knowledge (z), and we manipulate the two VDT parameters designer role and  
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Independent 




Actor skill level represents competence in performing a particular task type and 
reflects specialist expertise. The default skill is Generic, indicating the abilities of 
an average worker. Actors can be assigned other skills, such as Design, or 
Manufacturing, depending on their specific areas of expertise. An actor can have 
a high, medium, or low level of each skill. An actor’s skill level compared with the 
requirement complexity of a task affects task duration, cost, rework and functional 





Two VDT parameters are used to represent trans-specialist expertise. 1) Actor 
role represents competence in integration for a particular type of product. In VDT, 
actor role can be set at three levels, reflecting low, medium, or high levels of 
product integration expertise. With increasing levels of actor role settings, actors 
become more likely to rework project exceptions, instead of merely quick-fixing or 
ignoring them. 2) Application experience represents an actor's program level 
experience, which transcends specialist knowledge (i.e. is trans-specialist in 
nature).  In VDT, an actor can have a high, medium, or low level of application 
experience.  An actor's role, combined with application experience, represents 
trans-specialist capability. Together with solution complexity, these affect task 
duration, cost, rework and project risk, but not functional risk. Therefore, in VDT, 
an increase or decrease in trans-specialist understanding is modeled as a two-by-





Requirement complexity is used to represent task complexity. It is defined as the 
number of internal project requirements that a task must satisfy. Requirement 
complexity can be set at high, medium, or low levels.  A highly optimized design, 
for example, has many tasks with a high requirement complexity. Increasing 
requirement complexity increases task duration, cost, rework and functional 




Solution Complexity is used to represent product modularity (inversely). It is 
defined as the effect that a task has on the tasks that depend on it. Solution 
complexity can be set at high, medium, or low levels, representing low, medium 
and high levels of modularity, respectively. Higher solution complexity increases 
task duration, cost, rework and project exception levels.  
  
Actor salary Actor Salary describes an actor’s hourly wage. 
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Task 
concurrency 
Task Concurrency is the degree to which tasks are conducted in series or in 
parallel. When product development schedules are shortened to meet corporate 
goals, tasks that are usually performed sequentially must be performed in parallel. 
Coordinating parallel interdependent tasks is more difficult and costly than 
coordinating the same tasks performed sequentially because there is more rework 
and coordination. VDT builds on data from cases and analyses that assess the 
coordination and rework that arise from fast-tracking (Christiansen, 1993). 
  
Centralization 
Centralization reflects the degree to which decisions are made by senior actors or 
decentralized to individual responsible actors. High centralization means 
decisions are made by high-level actors. With low centralization, responsible 
positions tend to make their own decisions and there is thus less communication 
required. Centralization affects how often information is passed from lower to 
higher level actors, as well as how high that information goes up the hierarchy.  
 
Table 2   Independent Variables and Description of VDT Parameters 
 
designer application experience to represent different levels of trans-specialist knowledge (h). 
The correspondence between the VDT parameter manufacturing skill and the analytical model 
parameter z should be clear: greater manufacturing skill reflects greater specialist knowledge, 
and vice versa. This representation of z is theoretically consistent with Postrel’s argument (pg. 
309) that specialist knowledge improves an actor’s ability to “hit cost, quality and ramp-up 
constraints with a high fraction of possible designs.” Indeed, the manufacturing skill variable 
within the VDT model offers precisely this outcome—i.e., it reduces the cost, schedule and 
functional risk associated with completion of the manufacturing task.  
The correspondence between the VDT parameters actor role and actor application 
experience and the analytical model parameter h has a similar basis: greater product-integration 
expertise and programmatic experience reflect greater trans-specialist understanding. This 
representation of h corroborates Postrel’s stated but unmodeled conviction (pg. 308) that “trans-
specialist understanding reduces the likelihood that various functional specialties will create 
problems for one another (design, prototyping, engineering, manufacturing, marketing, etc.), or 
that groups assigned to work on one part of a product will create components that do not 
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interact properly.”  Indeed, the combination of application experience and actor role within the 
VDT model achieves  
Dependent  






Simulated project duration (SPD) is the predicted time to perform a project, in 
working days, which includes both direct and indirect (i.e. coordination, rework 






Simulated labor cost (SLC) is the predicted cost of labor to perform a project, in 
dollars, which includes both direct and indirect (i.e. coordination, rework and 




Functional risk index (FRI) (or Component Quality Index), measures the risk to 
quality arising from functional exceptions. Functional exceptions are problems that 
affect only the task from which they arise. Any rework incurred applies only to that 
task. Rework links have no interaction with functional exceptions. In project work 
terms, FRI represents the likelihood that components produced by this project 
have defects based on rework and exception handling. Numerically, FRI is 
calculated as the fraction of effort needed to process ignored and quick-fixed 
functional exceptions normalized by the total effort to rework all predicted 




Project risk index (PRI) (or Project Quality Index) measures the risk to quality 
arising from project exceptions. Project exceptions are problems that arise in a 
driver task that may have an effect on work in a dependent task linked to the first 
task via a rework link. In the absence of rework links, project exceptions have no 
meaning. In project work terms, PRI represents the likelihood that the 
components produced by this project will not be integrated at the end of the 
project, or that the integration will have defects based on rework and exception 
handling. PRI is thus a measurement of the success of system integration. 
Numerically, PRI is calculated as the fraction of effort needed to process ignored 
and quick-fixed project exceptions normalized by the total effort to rework all 
predicted project exceptions.  
 
Table 3   Dependent Variables and Description of VDT Parameters 
  
exactly this result—i.e., it improves the likelihood of successful product integration across 
functional specialties. Furthermore, these representations of z and h are also grounded 
empirically in research on operational organizations in practice. Such research was conducted 
during the development of VDT.  It indicates that, as manufacturers become more specialized, 
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they tend to produce products of greater quality. Likewise, as design staff becomes more senior 
and experienced, they tend to exhibit greater sensitivity to project integration requirements. In 
the next section, these variables are defined more formally, along with other variables that are 
used in the hypothesis testing exercise.  
Dependent VDT Variables 
Table 3 notes the VDT parameters used to represent the four dependent variables—product 
development time, labor cost, functional risk and product risk—in our model.  
Replicating Postrel’s Analytic Model of Product Development  
Recall the first hypothesis concerning the substitutability of specialist and trans-specialist 
knowledge. To address this we examine the production function implicit within our 
computational model. We say “implicit,” because the computational model is not developed with 
an explicit production function specified. Nonetheless, we can analyze model outputs to assess 
the interactions of “micro-behavior” assumptions embedded within the model. Here we examine 
the basic product development model described above. 
 Using well-accepted Monte Carlo techniques, each model is simulated 100 times, with 
means and variances computed from empirically derived statistical distributions (see Jin and 
Levitt 1996, Levitt et al. 2005 for details). In the data tables below, each cell provides the 
sample mean of 100 individual simulation trials. Statistical significance is computed using a 
single factor ANOVA test. Although such statistical inference from simulated performance data 
and predefined distributions remains one-off from the performance of operational organizations, 
it provides some sense of variation and hence significance, and it extends the analytical model 
of Postrel by testing hypotheses statistically. 
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Table 4a   Baseline Product Development Model – Results 
  SPD (days)* SPC ($K)** 
       
High h 326 262 210 $93 $75 $59 
Med. h 380 316 263 $109 $90 $75 
Low h 441 378 325 $127 $109 $94 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences in h and z both significant.3 
** Differences in h and z both significant. 
 
Table 4b   Baseline Product Development Model – Results 
  FRI (%)* PRI (%)** 
       
High h 0.63 0.39 0.32 0.47 0.47 0.46 
Med. h 0.62 0.42 0.31 0.60 0.60 0.62 
Low h 0.63 0.40 0.34 0.76 0.77 0.76 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences in h insignificant; differences in z significant. 
** Differences in h significant; differences in z insignificant. 
 
Computational results for the baseline model are summarized in Tables 4a and 4b.4 The 
values listed in Table 4a reflect simulated project duration (SPD), expressed in workdays, and 
simulated project cost (SPC), expressed in dollars (thousands: $K). For instance, notice the 
result in the middle of the SPD half of the table: a project staffed with actors possessing 
adequate levels of manufacturing specialist knowledge (i.e., medium z) and adequate levels of 
trans-specialist knowledge (i.e., medium h) is projected by the model to require 316 total days to 
complete. This reflects the nominal 200 days of work specified (i.e., work volume), along with 82 
non-work days (e.g., weekends), and 34 days of additional problem solving (e.g., internal 
communication, delay and exception handling associated with noise, uncertainty and errors). 
The additional 34 days’ problem solving time reflects empirically determined relationships 
between model parameters (e.g., levels of z and h) and organizational performance. Similarly, 
                                                          
3 Statistical significance reported at the 0.05 level. 
4Table 4 reports project level metrics.  VDT also provides task level metrics, but these are not reported 
because they lack comparability with the project level outputs of Postrel’s (2002) analytic model. 
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notice the result in the center of the SPC half of the table. The $90K project cost consists of 
$80K of direct work, $8K of rework, and $2K of coordination. 
The values listed in Table 4b reflect the functional risk index (FRI), expressed as the 
ratio of functional exceptions that are quick-fixed or ignored versus the total number of 
exceptions (i.e. the total of those that are quick-fixed, ignored and reworked), and the project 
risk index (PRI), expressed as the ratio of project exceptions that are quick-fixed or ignored 
versus the total number of exceptions. For instance, note the result in the middle of the FRI side 
of the table: a project staffed with actors with medium h and medium z is projected by the model 
to quick-fix or ignore 42% of functional exceptions over the course of a project. Likewise, notice 
the result in the center of the PRI half of the table: 60% of project exceptions are quick-fixed or 
ignored by the project decision makers. 
Tables 4a and 4b report full-factorial results of nine simulation models (each run 100 
times), with both the z (i.e., specialist knowledge) and h (i.e., trans-specialist knowledge) 
parameters varying across three levels: low, medium, and high. Notice in Table 4a that the 
simulation results vary as expected, and significantly, across the three levels of both z and h. 
For instance, holding the parameter h constant at the medium level of trans-specialist 
knowledge, performance in terms of both project duration and cost ranges from 380 days and 
$109K dollars when specialist knowledge is low, to 263 days and $75K when specialist 
knowledge is high. This mirrors the monotonic relationship between payoff and specialist 
knowledge described in the analytical model, and indicates the marginal product of such 
knowledge is positive (i.e., consistent with neoclassical microeconomic theory). This same 
monotonic relationship is exhibited also at the other levels of trans-specialist knowledge (i.e., 
low h, high h). Likewise, holding the parameter z constant at the medium level of specialist 
knowledge, performance in terms of project duration ranges symmetrically from 378 days and 
$109K dollars when trans-specialist knowledge is low, to 262 days and $75K dollars when 
trans-specialist knowledge is high. This mirrors the monotonic relationship between payoff and 
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trans-specialist knowledge described in the analytical model also, and is evident too at the other 
levels of specialist knowledge (i.e., low z, high z).  
The symmetry reflected in the results of Table 4a corresponds to the microeconomic 
case of perfect substitution: specialist and trans-specialist knowledge can be substituted—unit 
for unit—to maintain performance at some arbitrary level. For instance from the table, where 
specialist knowledge (z) is low, but trans-specialist knowledge (h) is medium, performance (380 
days, $109K dollars) is practically the same (378 days, $109K dollars) as where specialist 
knowledge (z) is medium, but trans-specialist knowledge (h) is low. Other instances of such 
substitutability can be identified readily through different combinations of knowledge types z and 
h (e.g., low z, high h <--> high z, low h [326 days, $93K], high z, medium h <--> medium z, high 
h [263 days, $75K]). With this our computational model results replicate the basic premise of the 
analytical model: specialist and trans-specialist knowledge can represent substitutes for one 
another. 
While the data in Table 4a reflect symmetry, the data in Table 4b do not afford such a 
matched pattern. Instead, we see that project risk is influenced primarily by trans-specialist 
knowledge h, and that functional risk changes principally in relation to the specialist capability 
parameter z. Compared to Postrel’s finding, this significant, non-symmetric result reveals a 
more complex and nuanced set of relations between the different kinds of knowledge and 
multiple dimensions of performance, which we discuss at length in our hypothesis testing below. 
In terms of computational experimentation, the significant, simulation results in Table 4a 
from above support our null hypothesis H0 (i.e., “specialist and trans-specialist knowledge can 
be substituted for one another without affecting performance”). With support for the null as such, 
we note three initial contributions from this work. First, through this computational experiment, 
we use VDT to replicate the basic findings articulated by Postrel’s (2002) analytical model; such 
replication increases our confidence in the analytical model and its implications. Second, 
through a model that has been validated empirically, we use VDT to show the basic premises of 
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the analytical model have some resemblance to the physical world; such computational 
validation likewise increases our confidence in the analytical model and its external validity. 
Third, through a computational model that captures the basic structure and behavior of the 
analytical model, we can extend the analysis to new cases not yet evaluated, factor in aspects 
of product development projects that reflect the real world better, and enrich the analysis with a 
much finer-grained set of measurement variables that represent multiple dimensions of 
performance including schedule, cost and the risk indices shown in Table 4b. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing is organized into seven categories: 1) multi-dimensional performance, 2) 
microeconomic complementation, 3) competitive strategies, 4) product modularity, 5) 
component complexity, 6) concurrency, and 7) centralization. We address each in turn. 
1) Multi-Dimensional Performance 
The baseline results in Table 4b confirm that specialist knowledge (z) brings a significant 
reduction in the risk of functional errors (FRI), but that it does not impact the level of project 
integration risk (PRI). In contrast, while functional risk varies only negligibly across the three 
levels of trans-specialist knowledge, project integration risk falls substantially as interspecialist 
capability rises. These findings provide support for hypotheses 1a and 1c. With respect to 
budget and schedule, Table 4a indicates that both metrics drop sharply as we go from low 
levels to high levels of specialist knowledge in manufacturing (i.e., this drop is approximately 
30%, from 380 to 263 workdays and from $109K to $75K). Furthermore, when trans-specialist 
knowledge is increased in the design phase, both budget and schedule fall also. Thus, our 
model predicts that greater trans-specialist knowledge brings a reduction in both product 
integration risk and development time and cost. This finding, which disconfirms hypothesis 1b, 
also runs contrary to an important conclusion drawn after the Challenger shuttle disaster, which 
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was that a reduction in overall product risks often comes at the cost of a longer product 
incubation period (Vaughan 1990). 
2) Microeconomic Complementation 
Recall hypotheses 2a and 2b concerning the expected complementary interaction of the two 
knowledge types. From Tables 4a and 4b (above) we see that the two knowledge types are 
close substitutes, not complements, for both the SPD and SPC dimensions of performance. 
Thus, hypothesis 2a is not supported for the schedule and cost performance dimensions. 
Furthermore, our model suggests that the two knowledge types play very distinctive roles. While 
trans-specialist knowledge reduces the risk of product integration failures, specialist knowledge 
reduces the risk of functional failures; both knowledge types reduce labor cost and schedule 
duration. Thus, when enriching the analysis beyond cost and schedule variables, to reflect 
functional and project risks, the two knowledge types reflect complements, not substitutes, in 
the sense that they both contribute uniquely to an increased likelihood of new product success, 
or overall “expected payoff.” Thus, hypothesis 2a is supported for the functional- and project-risk 
performance dimensions. 
This result departs from that derived in the analytical model. Recall the analytical 
model’s production function specifies maximum performance can be attained when either 
knowledge type is high (e.g., z = 1, h = 1), and nothing is gained when both knowledge types 
are high. The same departure of results applies to low levels of knowledge. In contrast, the 
computational model reveals specialist and trans-specialist knowledge interacting even when 
both types are high or low. This provides some evidence to support hypothesis 2b (i.e., “Using 
predominately specialist knowledge in product development leads to inferior performance than 
when appreciable levels of trans-specialist knowledge are also employed”). In microeconomic 
terms, the marginal product of both specialist and trans-specialist knowledge remains positive 
always. 
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3) Competitive Strategies 
Given that the two knowledge types have different effects on the multiple dimensions of 
performance, our model suggests that firms will value the two knowledge types in accordance 
with their competitive strategy. When a firm is competing on price, and is relatively less 
concerned about product quality, for instance, the symmetric results in Table 4a suggest that 
the marginal-cost benefit of increased specialist knowledge is equivalent to that of increased 
trans-specialist knowledge, and that the best performance is achieved through symmetric, high 
levels of both knowledge types. This disconfirms hypothesis 3a. In contrast, if a firm is 
competing on product quality, and is relatively less concerned about price, for instance, then the 
asymmetric results in Table 4b suggest that the marginal benefit of increased specialist versus 
trans-specialist knowledge depends upon the extent to which component quality (i.e., as 
measured by FRI) or project quality (i.e., as measured by PRI) is stressed. This result elucidates 
nicely the different contributions of specialist knowledge and trans-specialist knowledge on 
quality and hence competitive strategy. As such, this result provides mixed support for 
hypothesis 3b. 
These simulated results fit closely with observations in practice of legendary firms like 
IDEO and Walt Disney, which attract, integrate and retain extremely diverse skill sets in order to 
build their differentiated product brands. The Walt Disney Imagineering website boasts the 
integration of more than 140 specialist disciplines! The IDEO corporate website claims that 
“multi-disciplinary teams are at the heart of the IDEO method,” and lists more than a dozen 
broad functional areas of expertise. Our simulation results confirm that in this type of product-
differentiated firm, integrating interspecialist capabilities to unify diverse skill sets is of great 
value. Likewise, our results suggest that for firms competing on cost, such as McDonalds 
restaurants, it is important to maintain both specialist and trans-specialist capabilities. 
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4) Product Modularity 
 
Tables 5a and 5b present ratios to show how project outcome metrics change as product 
modularity rises, which is represented in our VDT model by a decrease in solution complexity. 
These ratios reflect increases or decreases in normalized terms relative to the baseline results 
in Tables 4a and 4b. Notice in Table 5a that as product modularity rises, reflecting a decrease in 
the complexity of interface requirements between sub-components, then both duration and cost 
fall by 2% to 3% relative to the baseline. Project risk falls by between 14% and 21%, but 
functional risk is not nearly as sensitive to product modularity. Notice also that the extent of the 
drop in project risk is influenced by the level of trans-specialist knowledge. With lower levels, 
this drop is close to 20%; with higher levels, it is only about 15%. Likewise, for a decrease in 
product modularity (e.g., a less-mature product with more complex interface requirements) the 
results generated by VDT (not shown) are similar in magnitude but in the opposite direction. 
This result provides support for hypothesis 4, that the marginal value of trans-specialist 
knowledge falls as products become increasingly modular. 
Table 5a   SPD and SPC Ratios – High Product Modularity 
  % Change in SPD* % Change in SPC** 
       
High h -2% -3% -2% -2% -3% -3% 
Med. h -2% -2% -3% -2% -2% -2% 
Low h -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
Table 5b   FRI and PRI Ratios – High Product Modularity 
  % Change in FRI* % Change in PRI** 
       
High h 2% 3% 0% -16% -14% -14% 
Med. h 0% -5% 6% -18% -18% -19% 
Low h -2% -2% 0% -19% -21% -19% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h significant; differences in z insignificant. 
 28
Center for Edge Power – Working Paper 2006-1 
 
5) Component Complexity 
Tables 6a and 6b present ratios to show how project outcome metrics change as component 
complexity rises, which is represented in our VDT model by an increase in requirement 
complexity. These ratios reflect normalized changes relative to the baseline results in Tables 4a 
and 4b. Notice in Table 6a that as component complexity rises, reflecting more internal 
requirements that are “hidden” to all but that specific component (Baldwin and Clark 1997), then 
both duration and cost rise by 2% to 3% relative to the baseline. Functional risk rises by 
between 14% and 26%, but project risk is not nearly as sensitive to component complexity. 
Upon inspection, we see that the extent of this rise in functional risk is influenced by the level of 
specialist knowledge. At higher levels, this rise is near an average of 15%; whereas, with lower 
levels, it is approximately 22%. Analogously, for a decrease in component complexity the results 
generated by VDT (not shown) are in the opposite direction but of magnitude. This result 
provides support for hypothesis 5: the marginal value of specialist knowledge rises as product 
components become increasingly complex. 
Table 6a   SPD and SPC Ratios – High Component Complexity 
  % Change in SPD* % Change in SPC** 
       
High h 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Med. h 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 
Low h 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
 
Table 6b   FRI and PRI Ratios – High Component Complexity 
 
  % Change in FRI* % Change in PRI** 
       
High h 20% 20% 16% 0% 4% 4% 
Med. h 20% 17% 14% 0% 0% -6% 
Low h 26% 21% 14% 1% 0% 1% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h insignificant; differences in z significant. 
** Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
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6) Reciprocal interdependence 
To test hypothesis 6, two different models were prepared. The first included a start-start 
successor relationship, so that the manufacturing task commenced just as the design task was 
75% complete, after which the two tasks are performed contemporaneously (i.e., 25% schedule 
concurrency). The second model followed the same logic, except that the degree of 
concurrency was set to 50%. Results of the eighteen simulations are summarized in Tables 7a 
through 7d, and are shown relative to the baseline results depicted in Tables 4a and 4b. Notice 
first that concurrent development requires less time than does the sequential development 
specified in the baseline model. For the case of 25% concurrency, this schedule reduction is in 
the range of 13% to 20%, and for the case of 50% concurrency, it is in the range of 23% to 34%. 
Notice second that as concurrency rises, the level of project risk (PRI) also rises. For the case 
of 25% concurrency, PRI rises by approximately 1% relative to the baseline model, and for the 
case of 50% concurrency it rises by about 3%. Although these rises appear small, they highlight 
the classic trade-off between time-to-market and product quality discussed in the product 
development literature (Bayus 1997). Notice third that as concurrency rises, the project labor 
costs rise reflecting greater amounts of re-work and coordination. This rise is in the range of 1% 
in the first case and 2% in the second case.  These results confirm support for hypothesis 6a, 
that with greater concurrency, overall schedule duration decreases, but at the cost of an 
increase in both product cost and quality risk. While the VDT model can replicate these trade-
offs, the results of the experiment do not confirm support for hypothesis 6b. There is no 
evidence suggesting that trans-specialist knowledge plays an increasingly important role in 
reducing product risk at higher levels of concurrency. 
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Table 7a   SPD and SPC Ratios – 25% Concurrency 
  % Change in SPD* % Change in SPC** 
       
High h -14% -16% -20% 0% 0% 1% 
Med. h -13% -17% -20% 1% 0% 1% 
Low h -13% -16% -19% 1% 0% 1% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h insignificant; differences in z significant. 
** Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
Table 7b   FRI and PRI Ratios – 25% Concurrency 
 
  % Change in FRI* % Change in PRI** 
       
High h -2% 3% -3% 2% 0% 2% 
Med. h -2% -2% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
Low h -2% -2% -3% 1% 0% 1% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
Table 7c   SPD and SPC Ratios – 50% Concurrency 
  % Change in SPD % Change in SPC 
       
High h -23% -27% -34% 1% 1% 2% 
Med. h -23% -27% -33% 2% 1% 2% 
Low h -23% -27% -32% 2% 0% 3% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h insignificant; differences in z significant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
Table 7d   FRI and PRI Ratios – 50% Concurrency 
  % Change in FRI* % Change in PRI** 
       
High h 0% 3% 3% 2% 4% 4% 
Med. h 2% -5% 3% 3% 3% 2% 
Low h 2% -2% 0% 3% 1% 4% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
7) Centralization 
To test hypothesis 7, we altered the model set-up slightly, by adding a management actor with 
supervision links to the design and manufacturing actors. Then we performed two, 3x3, full-
factorial simulations, one with centralization set to low, and the other with centralization set to 
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high. The results are shown in Tables 8a to 8d, again relative to the baseline model. Upon 
inspection of Tables 8a and 8b, we see first that adding a management actor increases time 
and cost slightly, but reduces project risk significantly. This is the case, even when centralization 
is low, and the management actor is handling relatively few of the exceptions encountered by 
subordinates. Furthermore, we see in Tables 8c and 8d that at high levels of centralization, the 
duration and cost continue to rise a bit, but project integration risks fall considerably. Notice that 
at lower levels of trans-specialist knowledge, this effect is much stronger than it is at higher 
levels of trans-specialist knowledge. This occurs because, in the VDT model, the management 
actor plays a larger compensating role in exception handling for subordinates with low 
interspecialist experience than for subordinates with high interspecialist experience. Therefore, 
the evidence confirms that in a more centralized organization, it is relatively less important for 
subordinates to possess trans-specialist knowledge, and vice-versa. Based on this evidence, 
hypothesis 7 is supported. 
Table 8a   SPD and SPC Ratios – Management with Low Centralization 
  % Change in SPD* % Change in SPC** 
       
High h 3% 1% 1% 3% 3% 2% 
Med. h 2% 1% 2% 3% 2% 2% 
Low h 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
 
Table 8b   FRI and PRI Ratios – Management with Low Centralization 
  % Change in FRI* % Change in PRI** 
       
High h 2% 5% 3% -23% -21% -17% 
Med. h 3% -5% 6% -23% -18% -19% 
Low h 0% -2% -6% -26% -27% -28% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h insignificant; differences in z significant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
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Table 8c   SPD and SPC Ratios – Management with High Centralization 
  % Change in SPD* % Change in SPC** 
       
High h 3% 2% 1% 4% 4% 3% 
Med. h 5% 4% 4% 6% 6% 7% 
Low h 8% 8% 6% 9% 10% 10% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h significant; differences in z insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h significant; differences in z insignificant. 
 
Table 8d   FRI and PRI Ratios – Management with High Centralization 
  % Change in FRI* % Change in PRI** 
       
High h 2% 5% 0% -49% -45% -46% 
Med. h 2% -2% 0% -53% -52% -53% 
Low h 0% -5% 3% -63% -64% -67% 
 Low z Med. z  High z Low z Med. z  High z 
* Differences relative to baseline insignificant; differences in h and z both insignificant. 
** Differences relative to baseline significant; differences in h significant; differences in z insignificant. 
 
Summary 
For the most part, simulation results from our computational models support extant organization 
theory. This is to be expected, for the micro-behaviors used to develop such models are derived 
from information-processing views of organization theory. Likewise for the most part, simulation 
results from our computational models are consistent with organizational practice. This is also to 
be expected, for the micro-behaviors used to develop such models have been validated against 
organizational practice. Further, our initial basic result—that specialist and trans-specialist 
knowledge can represent substitutes—supports the central premise of the analytical model. This 
provides some computational support for the analytical model, and it provides analytical 
validation for the computational model. Through biangulation between the analytical and 
computational model results, we gain increased confidence in both approaches. 
 In contrast, the analytical model’s most controversial results are not consistent with 
those obtained through computational experimentation. Nor do many of its simplistic 
assumptions appear to generalize well from the tidy realm of mathematical analysis to the 
messy domain of organization knowing and learning. In particular we show: how multiple 
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performance metrics are necessary to assess the multidimensional and more nuanced 
influences that specialist and trans-specialist knowledge exert on organizational performance; 
how the relative costs and benefits of specialist and trans-specialist knowledge vary; how trans-
specialist knowledge can actually increase schedule duration as more constraints are placed on 
requirements; and how the two knowledge types interact, even when both types are high or low, 
as complements in some cases and as substitutes in others.  
In response to Postrel’s provocative question, “Under what circumstances is it necessary 
for specialists to develop mutual understanding?” we offer several theoretical insights. Our 
results indicate that trans-specialist knowledge becomes increasingly beneficial as competitive 
strategy becomes more sensitive to product quality, as product modularity declines, and as 
decision-making becomes less centralized. In contrast to his metaphor islands of shared 
knowledge, our computational experiments suggest how the alternate metaphor streams of 
shared knowledge appears to fit much better: Shared knowledge need not be omnipresent (e.g., 
consider oceans of shared knowledge), but it is important frequently for knowledge to flow 
across functional specialists.  
CONCLUSION 
Our contribution in this article to the organization studies literature is three-pronged. First, we 
expose a weakness in the existing body of theory through our critique of Postrel's analytic 
model. Second, we propose and test a set of hypotheses pertaining to Postrel’s central research 
question, and by doing so we provide a much finer-grained set of theoretical insights than was 
possible through the analytic model. Third, we apply computational experimentation in our 
analysis, which represents a relatively recent approach to testing theory related to 
organizational knowing and learning. We hope that other researchers are stimulated to conduct 
further research along these lines based on the power and potential of this method. 
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 We can imagine several situations that we were unable to test within the VDT modeling 
environment, under which trans-specialist knowledge becomes increasingly valued in 
organizations. When organizational conflict is high, it is likely that trans-specialist capability is 
important as a means to mediate between divergent “local languages” and “thought worlds.” 
When managers lack resources to hire sufficient specialists, such as during the early phases of 
entrepreneurial growth of small businesses, then it is likely that early hires who must “bootstrap” 
by simultaneously managing multiple roles and functions benefit from trans-specialist 
understanding. Moreover, when managers establish new organizations or functional-teams, it is 
likely that their ability to assemble a cooperative, non-redundant group of functional specialists 
rises with increasing levels of interspecialist knowledge. Finally, and more generally, in any 
situation where it is important for an organization to explore new product, process or market 
terrain, trans-specialist knowledge is probably beneficial to evaluate simultaneous disciplinary 
constraints (e.g., marketing, public relations and manufacturing constraints) that bear on overall 
decision making, but that are not yet well understood or formalized into codes, rules and 
procedures. 
These situations represent opportunities for future researchers to continue to explore the 
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